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Abstract 
India’s fiscal deficit and steep deterioration in state finances is a source of concern. The 
literature abounds with references to the combined fiscal deficit of the center and the states 
currently at over 10 per cent of GDP. During no other eight year period has the debt-GDP ratio 
rose by more than 10 percentage points where the ratio of outstanding debt to GDP increased 
from 21 per cent in 1996-97 to 35 per cent in 2004-05 (Budget Estimate). In this paper, we 
contend that the lack of State fiscal discipline is due in large part to a flawed intergovernmental 
fiscal system that fosters fiscal profligacy at the state level. Specifically, the States are highly 
dependent on transfers from the Union Government, which breaks the Wicksellian link between 
costs and benefits. There is a lack of transparency and accountability in the system because of 
extensive use of inadequate revenue assignments, lack of sufficient decentralization to local 
bodies, and a poorly designed intergovernmental transfer system. Finally, the States are operating 
under soft budget constraints which encourage fiscal profligacy.  
In this paper, we concentrate our discussion on issues related to the intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer system. We contend that the high transfer dependency of the states has weakened 
accountability and fiscal discipline. The transfer system is also very complex and lacks 
transparency and coordination among the institutions in charge of implementing transfers, which 
together produce a cycle of distorting incentives.  If the fiscal behavior of the States reflects the 
incentives created by the intergovernmental system, as we contend, then, absent structural reform 
of the intergovernmental fiscal system that addresses the perverse incentives of the current 
system, the fiscal trends described above are likely to persist. Although the Twelfth Finance 
Commission (TFC) has addressed some of the issues related to the intergovernmental fiscal 
system and soft budget constraint, there is still an urgent need to tackle other issues in the 
intergovernmental fiscal system that create perverse incentives and soften budget constraints. 
This emphasizes the need for the State and Union Governments of India to strengthen and 
accelerate the reform of India’s intergovernmental system. 
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Introduction 
Indian State finances are a source of growing concern. According to the Twelfth Finance Commission 
Report (2004, page 37), “…the six years from 1997-1998 to 2002-2003, have been the worst in the 
history of state finances.” During this period, the ratio of state debt-to-GDP increased from 21 percent to 
35 percent. The literature abounds with references to the combined fiscal deficit of the center and the 
states, currently at over 10 percent of GDP. In addition to the growing debt burdens of the states, the 
composition of state expenditures is also cause for serious concern. State expenditures on interest, 
pensions, and wages were approximately 76 percent of the total revenue receipts of the States in fiscal 
year (FY) 2003-04 (Revised Estimates), and investment in power, irrigation, transportation, and urban 
infrastructure has stagnated in recent years. This threatens India’s ability to sustain robust economic 
growth.  
 We contend that the lack of state fiscal discipline is due in large part to a flawed intergovernmental 
transfer system that fosters fiscal profligacy at the state level. Specifically, the States are highly dependent 
on transfers from the Union Government, which breaks the Wicksellian link between costs and benefits. 
The high transfer dependency of the states has weakened accountability and fiscal discipline. The transfer 
system is very complex and lacks coordination and transparency among the three current institutions in 
charge of implementing transfers, which together produce a cycle of distorting incentives. The transfer 
formulae are also complex and lack clearly defined objectives. If the fiscal behavior of the States reflects 
the incentives created by the intergovernmental transfer system, then, absent a structural reform of the 
intergovernmental fiscal system that addresses the perverse incentives of the current system, the fiscal 
trends described above are likely to persist. Although the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) has made 
an attempt to address some of the issues identified in the intergovernmental fiscal system, there is still an 
urgent need to tackle other issues in the system that create perverse incentives and soften budget 
constraints This emphasizes the need for the State and Union Governments of India to strengthen and 
accelerate the reform of India’s intergovernmental system. 
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In this paper, we discuss the problem of aggregate fiscal discipline as it relates to India’s 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system. We begin by reviewing the fiscal condition of the States of India 
in section I. Then, in section II, we identify the flaws specifically related to the design of the 
intergovernmental transfer system and soft budget constraints, and we incorporate the Twelfth Finance 
Commission’s recommendations to tackle these issues. Finally, in section III, we evaluate various options 
for reform of the transfer system in India and provide a set of recommendations. Section IV contains 
concluding remarks. 
 
Section I. The Fiscal Condition of State Finances 
The State List in the 7th Schedule of the Constitution entrusts the states with major expenditure 
responsibilities in the areas of human and physical development. However, the tax revenues of the States 
are not sufficient to meet these expenditure responsibilities. The resulting fiscal imbalances of the states 
are addressed through a complex system of intergovernmental transfers in various forms and through 
various channels. Additionally, over the years, the States of India have sought to finance their increasing 
needs for expenditures through loans, rather than by raising additional tax revenues and/or charging for 
services delivered. This has led to the States running large revenue and fiscal deficits and accumulating 
unsustainable debt burdens. In this process, most States have compromised budgetary discipline, resorted 
to off-budget forms of borrowing, and accumulated large contingent liabilities, with the attendant risks of 
default (Bahl et al, 2005). 
During the ten year period beginning in the mid-1980s, there was a slow but steady deterioration in 
the revenue deficits of the States. Starting in 1997-98, however, this steady decline turned into a sharp 
deterioration. As shown in figure I.1, state revenue deficits averaged 0.8 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) between 1987-88 and 1996-97, and 2.8 percent of GDP from 1997-98 to 2000-01. Then, 
in both 2001-02 and 2002-03, the States made some progress in reducing their revenue deficits. However, 
the revised estimates for 2003-04 show another sharp deterioration in state fiscal balances. The States are 
financing these deficits through borrowings. Consequently, the total debt of the States has increased from 
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the already high level of 20.7 percent of GDP in 1987-88 to 35 percent of GDP in 2004-05 (Budget 
Estimates) (RBI, 2004). Figure I.1 also shows the obvious fact that the growth in state revenue deficits is 
attributable to the failure of revenue receipts to keep pace with the growth in revenue expenditures. 
Absent a matching increase in revenue receipts, the fiscal shock represented by the large wage and 
pension increases by the States in 1997-98 has led the way to large and persistent revenue deficits and 
growing state debt burdens as a share of GDP.  
Figure I.2 shows that state expenditures on interest and pensions have overtaken the share of GDP 
spent by the States on economic services and capital expenditures and is rapidly approaching the share of 
GDP that States are now spending on social services. Although capital expenditures as a share of GDP are 
beginning to recover to the levels of the early 1990s, they are still substantially lower as a share of GDP 
than in the early 1980s. The share of GDP spent on economic services has declined sharply as well. 
Expenditures on the operation and maintenance of capital assets used in each of these sectors have 
declined, while explicit and implicit subsidies to irrigation, power, and transport have increased. 
Table 1 shows the aggregate trends in state deficits, including the steady but persistent revenue 
deficits in the early to mid-1990s and the sharp deterioration in revenue deficits beginning in 1998-99. 
The most persistent deterioration is observed in the ratio of revenue deficit to fiscal deficit, which 
indicates the extent to which borrowed funds are used to finance current expenditures. In 1993-94, this 
ratio was about 19 per cent. It has increased steadily to approximately 58 per cent by 2002-03. Finally, we 
see the accumulation of state debt, which was approximately 22 percent of GDP in 1993-94, and, as of 
2002-03, it stands at 31.15 percent of GDP. 
 
Section II. An Evaluation of India’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System 
 Generally speaking, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are used to correct for vertical and 
horizontal imbalances, inter-jurisdictional spillovers, and promote national objectives. Most federal 
countries, the U.S. appears to be the lone exception, use equalization grants to address horizontal fiscal 
disparities among jurisdictions. All countries, the U.S. included, use special purpose grants of one type or 
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another to promote national priorities and address inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Equalization grants, 
special purpose transfers, and often different forms of revenue sharing in themselves a type of transfer, 
are used to help reduce vertical imbalances or the mismatch between expenditure responsibilities and own 
sources of revenues for sub-national governments. 
However, the only fail proof way to address vertical imbalances is to provide sub-national 
governments with an adequate level of revenue autonomy. While a system of transfers is needed for many 
good reasons, it can easily be misused, and they should not be considered as a substitute for a healthy 
degree of tax autonomy, and this seems to be case of the states of India. The large vertical imbalance of 
the states arises from the fact that the central government has a greater taxing power while states have 
been entrusted with larger responsibilities.  
In India, the high transfer dependency of the States has weakened accountability and fiscal discipline. 
Table 2 shows how transfers from the central government represent a significant part of state finances. 
Shared taxes and grants from the Center to the States represent over 4 per cent of GDP.  We can see from 
the table that the share of transfers in state total revenues is nearly 38 percent which is about the same 
since the 1990’s. The share of transfers in state total expenditures represents about 31 percent, which is a 
decrease from the high 30’s in the 1990’s. Certainly, this decline in the share of transfers in state 
expenditures is attributable to state expenditures increasing at a much faster rate than state revenues. The 
Center also transfers close to 1 per cent of GDP in the form of loans to the states. These resources 
constitute over one-third of the aggregate fiscal resources available to the states.  
At any rate, in India, the high transfer dependency is not so much an issue compared to the 
complexity and lack of transparency and coordination of the transfer system.  A notable feature is the 
multiplicity of transfer channels from the Center to the States. First, there is a constitutional mechanism to 
devolve tax shares and give grants.1 Second, the Planning Commission gives grants and loans for 
implementing development plans. Finally, various ministries give grants to their counterparts in the States 
for specific projects which are either wholly funded by the Center (central sector projects) or requiring the 
states to share a proportion of the cost (centrally sponsored schemes) (Rao and Singh, 1998). 
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Additionally, there is a lack of coordination among the three current institutions in charge of 
implementing transfers. The development grants implemented by the Planning Commission create future 
non-plan expenditure liabilities for the states (i.e., debt service liabilities, infrastructure maintenance 
costs, and personnel costs). It is implicit in the gap filling of the grants-in-aid (GIA) approach that larger 
plan outlays financed by larger borrowing create larger state liabilities, which, in turn, generate larger 
claims for additional fiscal transfer from the Finance Commissions. Furthermore, the Planning 
Commission often receives pressure from the Center and the states to accept that the states will be able to 
generate additional resources. Based on such arguments, the Planning Commission then authorizes the 
states to borrow additional amounts (Rao and Singh, 1998). Thus, there is a cycle of distorting incentives 
due to the fact that the decision process is fragmented, without any single institution being responsible for 
looking at the system of transfers as a whole. 
Additionally, the Center has not fully exercised hierarchical control over state borrowing. The states 
have been able to avert the Center’s constitutional debt controls through off-budget borrowings and 
guarantees. Market borrowings of the states do not reflect creditworthiness, which contribute to the lack 
of fiscal discipline among the states.  
We now turn to evaluate central transfers according to the institutions in charge of intergovernmental 
transfers from the Center to the states:  
a. The Finance Commission Transfers 
A bulk of the central transfers to the States consists of general revenue sharing of proceeds of certain 
centrally levied taxes. The horizontal distribution is decided by the Finance Commission. In addition, the 
Finance Commission provides for grants-in-aid which are popularly known as “gap-filling” transfers as 
they are designed to cover for the deficit between projected expenditures and revenues after tax 
devolution with grants (Rao and Singh, 1998).  
The transfer methodology adopted by the Finance Commissions has numerous weaknesses. First, the 
formula used for tax devolution lacks a clear purpose. For instance, the Eleventh Finance Commission 
(EFC) (2000-2005) mixed variables pertaining to fiscal capacity and expenditure needs, but it did not 
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differentiate in a transparent way between these two fundamental means of equalization. The criteria of 
population, land area, and infrastructure index measure expenditure needs. But there is more to the 
measurement of expenditure need that is not covered by these indices, in particular the poverty rate, the 
unemployment rate, age structure, and the like.  The only criterion for fiscal capacity, although with a 
weight of 62.5 per cent, is income disparity. A more direct method to measure fiscal capacity would be 
the size of tax bases and their potential yield, and the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) is actually 
moving in this direction. 
Additionally, the EFC formula is pursuing more than an equalization objective because tax effort and 
fiscal discipline are in the formula. While these are worthwhile objectives, it is far from clear what they 
are pursuing within this framwork. The states also are unlikely to respond to these incentives due to their 
small weights in the formula. In many ways, the Finance Commission formula is not part of an 
equalization grant system but rather part of general or unconditional funding, which has equalization 
grant features. The TFC has tried to bring in the equalization principle for certain specific grants for 
education and health on the expenditure side. Although equalization should be pursued mostly, if not 
exclusively, by the equalization grant system in order to free up other grant instruments to pursue other 
objectives, this is a temporary positive move given the present need for more equalization in the system. 
b. The Planning Commission Transfers 
The Planning Commission (PC) in India is charged with the responsibility of enhancing productive 
public investments in the country by working out plan investments for each sector of the economy and 
each state based on the estimated resource availability.2 States work out their respective annual plans for 
each year and then the Planning Commission approves them. However, the plan transfers suffer from a 
number of shortcomings (Bahl et al, 2005).  
First, under pressure from the Center and States, it promotes increasing public investments even 
though they may be fiscally unsustainable. As a result, the PC pitches for higher 'Gross Budgetary 
Support' for plan, irrespective of the level of national or state indebtedness. The inability of the states to 
rein in revenue expenditure and an increasingly higher proportion of revenue expenditure component of 
 8
their plans has contributed to the states running very high and persistent revenue deficits. This is 
aggravated by the selection of plan schemes for states by the Planning Commission. Increasingly, most of 
the schemes financed from the central assistance recommended by the Planning Commission are revenue 
expenditure schemes. A stage has come where most of the borrowings undertaken by the states for plan 
are going for funding the non-plan or revenue component of the plan schemes.  
Second, the central assistance released through the Planning Commission is also in loan and grant 
form. The Gadgil formula 70-30 (10-90 in the case of special category states) loan-grant transfers create 
incentives for the states to assume debt in order to get the grant even though they otherwise may not have 
borrowed the funds because of their very high debt levels and for other reasons. The Planning 
Commission’s development projects create budgetary obligations on the states (debt service, maintenance 
and operation costs, and personnel costs) that are many times now shifted to the non-plan side as the 
states in their misconceived interest continue to treat these as plan expenditure, which prevents the 
Finance Commission from taking these into account when they make their recommendations.  
The present process tends to generate low rates of return on investments because there is a bias in 
favor of taking up new projects while projects that are underway are not fully funded and allowed to 
languish and remain unfinished for long periods of time. The longer periods for completion lower the rate 
of return on projects. Besides, the states are under funding maintenance and the current process does not 
provide any incentives to prevent this, which results in the faster deterioration in public infrastructure, and 
further lowering the rate of return.  
Third, the Gadgil formula, just as the Finance Commission formula, is a mixture of expenditure need 
and fiscal capacity elements, which are again mixed with other objectives (i.e. tax effort, fiscal 
management, national objectives, and special problems). The Finance Commission’s transfers are much 
more equalising than the Planning Commission’s because the criterion of per capita income disparities is 
much more equalising than the population criterion (Rao, 2000). The Finance Commission’s formula 
weights income disparities much more heavily than the Planning Commission’s formula   (62.5 versus 25 
per cent, respectively); and the Planning Commission weights population more heavily than the Finance 
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Commission (60 versus 10 per cent, respectively). Furthermore, the Gadgil formula is applied for 
allocation of only what is known as normal central assistance (NCA). There are several schematic 
allocations going through the state plan channel, which has different bases for resource allocation.  
c. Other Transfers – Centrally Sponsored Transfers 
Assistance provided to the states through central sector and centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) are 
an important source of revenue for the States of India, and in some respects they are the most 
controversial form of transfers due mainly to its arbitrariness and discretion. They are justified on the 
same bases as conditional grants are in other countries: addressing externalities/spillovers, pursuing 
national objectives, and so on, but it is generally recognized that there are too many schemes in India 
(Rao and Singh, 1998; Rao, 2000). In other countries, the problems associated with the proliferation of 
conditional grants generally has led to calls for (or effective) simplification and consolidation into a much 
smaller number of block grants. 
In India, in contrast, the trend has been in the opposite direction with a continued growth in the 
number of schemes. Additionally, these schemes provide a backdoor for the federal government to micro-
manage decisions that are ostensibly the responsibility of the states. Thus, CSSs burden the administrative 
capacity of the states and distort state decision-making and priorities. Furthermore, these schemes blur the 
lines of responsibility, particularly in the minds of voters. 
d. The Problem of Soft Budget Constraint 
Soft budget constrains typically arise when there is a high vertical gap, low sub-national revenue 
autonomy, high sub-national borrowing autonomy, and a history of debt forgiveness by the central 
government. In India, soft budget constraint has been institutionalized by the Center providing 
autonomous borrowing through plan loans, lending by the Center to the states, lending by the GoI owned 
institutions to the states without insistence on debt servicing capacity, ways and means advances from the 
Reserve Bank of India and MoF and the like. Neither the Center, nor the states, passed any law placing 
limits on their borrowing as envisaged in the Constitution of India. GoI has been providing substantial 
loan funding knowing fully well that the states are using the same for funding their revenue deficits. GoI 
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in 2003 decided to adopt a fiscal responsibility law. Some states have also done so. Now, the TFC has 
recommended a fiscal responsibility law that places statutory limits on both revenue deficits and fiscal 
deficits. The financing framework of the states now needs to be brought within a regime of hard budget 
constraints. 
The no bailout policy lacks credibility. In the past, the central government has rescheduled state debt 
and granted waivers of interest and principle, usually on the basis of recommendations of the Finance 
Commissions. The TFC has again recommended major debt-rescheduling with a lower rate of interest and 
a debt-waiver scheme. However, this has been linked to states adopting fiscal responsibility legislation 
and also to eliminating revenue deficits over a five year period. Nevertheless, such waivers may create 
expectations that the Center will bailout the states in the event of a future fiscal crisis. In which case, the 
states lack incentives to behave in a fiscally prudent manner. Many states also use off-budget borrowings 
and accumulation of arrears. Various orders have been issued by the GoI and the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI), which would, if implemented, bring off-budget borrowing to an end.  
 
Section IV. Options and Recommendations for Reform 
The challenges facing India’s intergovernmental fiscal system are wide and deep. Many of the key 
problems with the current system have their roots in the design of the constitution and legal system. These 
problems will be difficult but necessary to address. Other problems can be addressed through fine tuning 
of current institutions and processes. While the intergovernmental fiscal system in India would require 
reforms in other dimensions (i.e., revenue assignments, expenditure assignments, etc), we concentrate on 
evaluating options for reforming the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system. Although the TFC has 
made recommendations to correct some of the issues identified in this paper, we go further and provide 
additional options and recommendations.  
Lack of adequate equalization.  
Option 1: The objective of equalization could be exclusively pursued by an equalization grant system, 
which would distribute a pool of equalization funds via a formula based on the difference between 
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expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the states. This equalization grant system, should be designed, 
reviewed, and recommended by Finance Commissions every five years and implemented by the MoF. 
The formula used for the distribution of the equalization funds should capture the gap between estimated 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. Those states with a negative fiscal gap would not receive 
equalization grants, and the available funds would be distributed to each state with a positive fiscal gap in 
proportion; for example, to that state’s share in the total sum of positive fiscal gaps. Other options are 
available for the final distribution of available funds, for example, by bringing up the worse off states to 
minimum desired disparity level. Expenditure needs could be based either on a weighted index of proxies 
for needs including population, poverty, and population profiles (school age and the elderly), and so on. 
Alternatively, they could be based on a set of financial per capita norms for the main expenditure 
responsibilities of the states. The fiscal capacity measure could be based on a representative revenue 
system methodology that captures the revenue potential of the state from the taxes assigned to them and 
their respective tax bases. 
Recommendation 1: Equalization should be exclusively pursued by an improved and explicitly dedicated 
equalization grant system by merging the present tax share, Finance Commission’s grants, and Planning 
Commission’s NCA. The equalization grant will be funded by a stable formula as a share of dedicated 
central government revenues. The measurement of expenditure needs would be based on a weighted 
index of need proxies, and fiscal capacity would be measured by a modified representative revenue 
system that takes into account the revenue potential of the taxes assigned to the states. The Finance 
Commission should be entrusted with this job, and the MoF would be responsible for implementation. It 
may be necessary to make the Finance Commission a regular body in order to implement this 
recommendation. 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes.  
Option 1: A simplified, rationalized, and streamlined (very few in numbers) set of block grants could be 
established to replace the existing central schemes. As such, these conditional grants would be distributed 
as specific purpose grants, with very few rules and mandates, by the Center’s line ministries. These would 
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be very different from the current scheme-based programs in that they would be fully administered by the 
recipient sub-national government, with some discretion as defined by the specific nature of the transfer. 
These programs would be restricted to support those functions where increased state and local 
government spending are viewed as being in the national interest (i.e., improved fiscal management, tax 
administration, and improved social service delivery). 
Recommendation 2: The existing CSSs should be rationalized and simplified into a small number of 
specific purpose conditional grants. The Center should indicate the broad mandate and objective of these 
grants, rather than issuing detailed guidelines which micro-manages state affairs and uses a one size fits 
all approach among the states. The states should be free to design their programs and projects with the 
grant consistent with the objectives of the grant. The Center should focus on evaluating the efficacy of 
these state programs and projects as well as the sufficiency and timeliness of funding. 
Planning Commission’s Loan Grants Create Distorting Incentives.  
Recommendation 3: GoI should establish conditional matching grants for capital infrastructure purposes, 
after assessing the viability gap by way of grants, (i.e. without any borrowing component). These grants 
would be distributed to the states according to a formula based on population, land area, and an index of 
infrastructure deprivation.  
Coordination between the Finance and Planning Commissions.  
Option 1: The intergovernmental transfer functions of the Finance Commission and the Planning 
Commission could be merged into a single autonomous body. 
Option 2: In light of the economic and intergovernmental fiscal reforms underway in India, the role of the 
Planning Commission could be re-focused. More specifically, the distribution of block grants by the 
Planning Commission in the form of NCA could be transferred to the Finance Commission. Additional 
Central Assistance schemes, being very similar to the CSSs, could be integrated with the CSSs. The 
Planning Commission's resource allocation role could be limited to CSSs. The Planning Commission 
could concentrate on appraisal, evaluation, and monitoring of these programs. 
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Recommendation 4: The Planning Commission should be given a new set of responsibilities that is 
consistent with the economic and intergovernmental reforms underway in India. These new 
responsibilities should include appraisal, evaluation, and monitoring of the programs and schemes; 
evaluating the creditworthiness of the states; and reporting to the nation about the success or failure of the 
projects. The distribution of block grants by the Planning Commission in the form of NCA should be 
transferred to the Finance Commission. 
Soft Budget Constraint.  
Option 1: Either through the creation of a federal-state pact resulting in a federal budget code and/or the 
adoption of “Fiscal Responsibility Acts” by all states independently, borrowing practices should be 
brought under control by imposing the golden rule (state borrowing can only be used to finance capital 
investment spending) and ceilings of total debt and debt service payments as a percent of the revenue 
budget. Overseeing and enforcing these provisions may require personal liabilities and prosecution under 
federal laws of state government officials, as in Brazil. Monitoring compliance with these norms should 
be assigned to an autonomous body in order to insulate it from political influence, in contrast to the 
practice in Brazil. The Union Government must also assist in developing a mechanism for reporting these 
data in a timely manner and auditing the state accounts to insure the quality of the information provided 
by the states. 
Option 2: The Center could impose strict control and limits on state borrowing using its authority under 
Article 293(3) and disband providing loans from Union sources. State borrowing could be based on 
creditworthiness rather than need or an artificial sense of no-default. The Center could take measures to 
eliminate any form of inter-budgetary payment arrears, and prohibit state governments from borrowing 
from public enterprises of any sort. The Center could require the states to maintain at arms length the 
operation of existing public enterprises. The Center could require the inclusion of all contingent liabilities 
as part of the published quasi-fiscal deficit. The failure to repay debt as scheduled should carry significant 
consequences.   
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Option 3: Borrowing sources could be streamlined and borrowing limits re- imposed. All borrowing from 
special sources (required holdings of state government bonds by commercial banks, borrowing from 
pension funds, and shares of rural small savings, etc.) are examples of financial repression and should be 
phased out in a pre-announced manner over a two or three year period. Over the longer term, there should 
be a plan to phase-out all Union Government lending to the states (including small savings) and 
substitution of (consensual) private market lending. Imposing market discipline on state borrowing should 
be a long-term goal of the GoI and needs to be fully coordinated with financial sector reforms.       
Recommendation 5: States should be encouraged to adopt fiscal responsibility laws imposing a strict hard 
budget constraint. The Center should simultaneously use its authority under Article 293(3) to impose 
prudent borrowing control. Following recommendations of the TFC, loans from the Center should be 
discontinued. Gradually all borrowing from special sources should also be eliminated.  
Option 4: Leave it to the states to adopt fiscal responsibility laws on their own, with the Center exercising 
control only on borrowings by states to enforce a hard budget constraint. 
Recommendation 6: It is recommended that the GoI encourage the states to pass balanced budget laws 
and follow the golden rule for capital expenditures, by using the leverage and incentives provided by the 
TFC and by exercising its authority under Article 293 to impose borrowing ceilings. Fiscal responsibility 
laws should have procedures and penalties that discourage the practice of passing budgets with unrealistic 
forecasts of expenditures and revenues. This could include limiting pay increases to government 
employees based on affordability, as mandated in the Financial Emergency provisions of the Constitution 
of India. 
Sub-National Government Debt Bailouts.  
Option 1: The experiences of Brazil and Mexico with fiscal adjustment through debt-rescheduling and 
debt forgiveness, respectively, followed by a regulatory framework, and a credible no-bailout 
commitment may present a reasonable option for stabilizing the most fiscally distressed sub-national 
governments (Bahl et al, 2005). In India, this could be an option to stabilize budgets in the most indebted 
states, such as Rajasthan and West Bengal, in exchange for strict control, at least for a reasonable length 
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of time. The TFC calls for rescheduling of existing central government debt of the states and debt waiver 
linked to states adopting fiscal responsibility laws and eliminating their revenue deficits by 2008-09. 
Option 2: The GoI could immediately enforce a hard budget constraint. 
Option 3: If a state becomes fiscally insolvent, which is a real possibility, the Center may not be able to 
hold to a no bailout policy. If so, it may be wise to have a clear set of policies regarding the circumstances 
under which debt forgiveness will be granted to a state.  
Option 4: Capping the size of contingent liabilities assumed by state governments, and including all 
contingent liabilities as part of the published quasi-fiscal deficit. 
Recommendation 7: Establish a clear set of policies regarding the circumstances under which debt 
forgiveness will be granted to a state in the case of fiscal insolvency. It may be advisable to bring a law 
under the financial emergency provision of the Constitution to define the conditions where a State may be 
declared to be in financial emergency and rules for its resolution, such as restructuring and privatizing 
state owned enterprises, eliminating subsidies, cutting down on salaries, and pension reforms. 
 
Section V. Conclusion 
The preceding analysis of the fiscal condition of the States of India reveals serious concerns about the 
intergovernmental fiscal system in India. Although issues on the intergovernmental fiscal system in India 
are wide (i.e. expenditure, revenue, transfers, borrowing, local governments), in this paper we exposed 
our concern with the intergovernmental fiscal central-state transfer system, which as many other authors 
have recognized, it lacks objectivity, transparency, simplicity, fairness, and most importantly it induces 
the states into perverse incentives and soft budget constraints.  
Although designing an appropriate intergovernmental transfer system has been a challenge in most 
federations, and we cannot disregard India’s system’s achievement, there are some options that India 
could consider in order to move towards a more optimal design of its transfer system. While the option of 
merging the Finance and Planning Commissions into a single permanent unit has been highly 
controversial, it should be possible to re-focus the roles of the Finance and more importantly the Planning 
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Commission into a grant system with clear objectives and with the appropriate incentives for both the 
Center and the states. Equalization could be exclusively pursued by an improved and explicit equalization 
formula while CSSs could be rationalized and simplified into a small number of specific purpose 
conditional grants. As far as the concerns of soft budget constraints, states should be encouraged to adopt 
fiscal responsibility laws imposing a strict hard budget constraint (i.e. passing balanced budget laws and 
the golden rule for capital expenditures). The Center could simultaneously use its authority impose 
prudent borrowing control and establish a clear set of policies regarding the circumstances under which 
debt forgiveness will be granted to a state in the case of fiscal insolvency.  
 Although the Twelfth Finance Commission has addressed some of the issues related to the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system and soft budget constraint, there is still an urgent need to tackle 
other issues that create perverse incentives and soften budget constraints This emphasizes the need for the 
State and Union Governments of India to strengthen and accelerate the reform of India’s 
intergovernmental system. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 States other than the eleven special category states (SCS) are referred to as the general category states (GCS). 
States of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar are taken as undivided states for purposes of comparison 
for the entire period. T he constitutional mechanism for central transfers consists of devolving the shares of 
individual income tax (Article 270) and union excise duties (Article 272), and giving grants-in-aid to the states 
in need of assistance (Article 275). Tax devolution and grants are based on recommendations of a semi-judicial 
body, the Finance Commission, to be set up by the president of India every five years, under article 280. 
2 Estimated resource availability includes the balance from current revenue, contributions of public enterprises, 
additional resource mobilization, plan grants and loans, market borrowings and other miscellaneous capital 
receipts (Rao and Singh, 1998). 
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Table 1: 
Aggregate State Finances: Alternative Deficit Indicators 
(per cent of GDP) 
Year Revenue Deficit 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
Primary 
Deficit 
Revenue Deficit/ 
Fiscal Deficit Debt/GDP 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
0.45 
0.69 
0.73 
1.31 
1.23 
2.61 
2.82 
2.61 
2.68 
2.29 
2.35 
2.72 
2.59 
2.77 
2.94 
4.31 
4.64 
4.16 
4.09 
3.94 
0.52 
0.79 
0.76 
0.90 
0.93 
2.24 
2.34 
1.69 
1.41 
1.14 
19.05 
25.55 
28.06 
47.37 
42.01 
60.48 
60.87 
62.60 
65.49 
58.09 
21.79 
21.40 
21.00 
21.00 
21.73 
23.02 
25.20 
27.42 
29.37 
31.15 
Averages: 
1993-96 
[A] 
2000-3 
[B] 
[B]-[A] 
0.62 
2.53 
1.90 
2.55 
4.07 
1.51 
0.69 
1.41 
0.72 
24.22 
62.06 
37.84 
21.79
31.15
9.36
Source: RBI (2004). 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
Central Transfers to the States 
 
Year Transfers 
as a % of 
GDP 
Transfers as 
a % of 
Central Tax 
Revenues 
Transfers as a 
% of State 
Total Revenues 
Transfers as a % 
of State Total 
Expenditures 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
5.07 
4.41 
4.20 
4.23 
4.23 
3.61 
3.79 
4.22 
4.12 
4.02 
50.10 
42.77 
42.13 
47.96 
46.43 
38.57 
40.28 
46.17 
49.88 
45.32 
42.39 
39.13 
38.50 
39.50 
39.17 
38.78 
36.94 
38.22 
38.76 
37.33 
40.85 
36.84 
36.08 
35.16 
35.16 
29.07 
28.98 
30.92 
30.95 
30.80 
Source: Author’s calculations from Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission 
(2004). 
 
